Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July 1937-May 1942

Most Americans, including me, who are generally familiar with World War II mostly refer to the Pacific and European theaters of war. Many American historians give relatively short shrift to Japan’s invasion of China and other Asian countries. An exception is the Philippines, though one could argue even that attention is directed there mostly due to the magnetism of one Douglas MacArthur. Author Richard Frank deftly substitutes the term “Asia-Pacific War” to underline the interconnectivity between Japan’s invasions throughout Asia and America’s involvement in WW II. Indeed, many have long argued that WW II did not start on September 1, 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland. Frank convincingly lays out a compelling case that it was Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 that set in motion all the dominoes falling in WW II. Frank spends a great deal of time at the beginning of the book exploring the pre-war relationship between Japan and China as well as the many internal political and military forces in China. Most notably explored are the well-known figures, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang figures most prominently at this stage of the war (1937-1942) as he was nominally the military leader of Chinese forces fighting Japan. Japan was extremely brutal in pursuit of its war against China, most famously in the capture of Nanking. Chinese soldiers were often not allowed to surrender, and the Japanese ruthlessly killed civilians and raped women. Countless millions of Chinese were killed in the war. One can easily understand the antipathy so many Chinese feel toward Japan today, though I sense much of the hostility is stoked by the Chinese government for political purposes. Frank explores with significant primary sources the internal machinations of the Japanese government regarding China. The Japanese government seemed quite dysfunctional and the military at times stunningly insubordinate to the civilian leaders. Its army and navy often worked at cross purposes and for their own benefit. How the Japanese believed they could conquer all of China is a head scratcher; while there were more than a few Japanese figures who questioned the wisdom of the decision to invade and Japanese military tactics, their voices were silenced out of self-preservation. American and British efforts to aid China before Japan struck Pearl Harbor are nicely detailed. Communications and relations between Winston Churchill and FDR are deeply explored. Japan’s decision to go to war and American preparations in Hawaii are clearly set forth in this account. Frank fairly distributes the blame for Americans being surprised on December 7, 1941 and slays a number of myths. The heroic efforts of many Americans on that day of infamy come as no surprise to any reader. The fact that no American aircraft carriers were docked at Pearl Harbor that day was a stroke of good fortune in America’s early efforts to strike back at Japan in the coming months. Still, Japan was able to go on an incredible rampage for four months from December 1941 until April 1942 capturing territory from Wake Island to Burma. French Indochina (Vietnam), the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and many islands fell to Japan. As macabre as it may seem to do so, a tremendous amount of credit has to be given to the Japanese for their careful planning and logistics in attacking across such a wide expanse of ocean and land. I cannot think of any war in which one side has obtained such much ground across such a wide span in only four months. Of course, Japanese brutality continued seemingly unabated. Gruesome accounts of American and other Allied troops being captured and then beheaded, bayoneted, set on fire, fed to crocodiles, thrown into shark-infested waters, or killed in other ways are horrifying. As a biographer of Douglas MacArthur, Richard Frank is well positioned to describe the fall of the Philippines. His insight into MacArthur is spot on. As is Frank’s analysis of “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell’s efforts, or lack thereof, in Burma. Many British generals also do not fare well under Frank’s scrutiny. The crumbling of the British empire is also on full display here as one by one its “possessions” fell into Japanese hands. Though many British soldiers and their native allies fought bravely, the Japanese usually outnumbered them, had superior equipment, enjoyed air and naval superiority, and had excellent tactical plans (for the most part). Once the war was over, the movements for independence in these countries accelerated. Frank sets a relentless pace in his account of the Asia-Pacific War in this first of a three-book trilogy. Most well-known historians are very good writers. Frank’s writing is a notch above the pack and he is a true wordsmith. Most impressive is the deep analysis he constantly provides. His bibliography reflects his exhaustive research. Frank’s judgments are sound and amply supported. It is hard to imagine a trilogy on the Asia-Pacific War providing a better primer than this one. A few minor complaints. As a voracious consumer of military history, I am almost never satisfied by the amount or quality of maps. Given the amount of time spent on the Japan-China war, the one theater-wide map was a bit of a disappointment. There were a number of Chinese locations mentioned in the narrative that I could not locate in this map, and I needed to “Google” them on my phone to determine their location. I realize there is often tension between an author and publisher on the issue of maps. I also thought some of the sections in the final chapter were a bit abbreviated, which made me suspicious of editorial involvement to shorten the narrative as it was over 500 pages (before endnotes, bibliography, and index). The reader should be sure to read the endnotes as they often contain fascinating details and further analysis. They also provide the reader some valuable sources to read if they want to dig deeper into a particular battle, campaign, or subject. The word “masterpiece” is often overused in describing a book. Not here. I eagerly await the second and third books in this landmark trilogy.

Until a few years ago, we havent had much in English on the Sino-Japanese war that preceded the beginning of World War 2 in the Pacific. Frank has built on some of the books that have recently been published (Rana Mittler comes to mind as well as several other authors) to produce probably one of the most comprehensive and even handed volumes on the topic to date. He covers everything - military operations in all three dimensions (air, sea and land), personalities, ideology, political and diplomatic activity, economic factors, technological advances, tactics, training, and societal influences, all of which are deftly woven into an integrated tapestry presented in chronological fashion (he does deal with some issues thematically, but these are in the minority). That said, everything he discusses either revolves around or provides context to the military operations covered in the narrative. Its a hefty book and takes a while (a week for me) to read as Frank spares no relevant detail. I am a historian and have been interested in anything remotely resembling good military history for the past 50+ years. I do admit to skipping over some parts that I already knew about, but to tell the truth, more often than not I found myself learning stuff that I had never heard about before - such as the Chinese moving their industrial base westward into the interior after the initial Japanese advances inland. I had been very aware the Soviets did that in 1941, but did not know the Chinese performed a similar feat years before. Much to my surprise, Frank informed me that the Japanese military occupied northern Indochina without the knowledge or permission of their civilian leaders - much like they did in Manchuria years before. I also did not know that some Dutch, British and Australian troops continued to offer resistance in the Netherlands East Indies for months after the Japanese conquered that region. Franks rehabilitates some notables and excoriates others. I think for the most part he sticks to the facts and avoids partisanship. I did find his analysis of Stilwell compelling and his condemnation of the poor performance of some allied commanders in the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies relevant. The Japanese, on the other hand, make few tactical mistakes but their successes on land are marred by a hyper-aggressiveness that all too often results in prisoners being massacred. I found his reevaluation of Chiang Kai-shek refreshing and his willingness to assign more blame than other historians to Emperor Hirohito refreshing and innovative. That said, it is hard to envision the Japanese leadership following a different road given the highly charged emotional and ideological influences on their government. As one might guess from the above observation, his research is impressive and his analysis for the most part very relevant and quite intuitive. For instance, Frank points out that the Japanese killed 250,000 Chinese civilians in retaliation for their having helped the Doolittle raiders that parachuted into China following the April 1942 raid on Tokyo. Frank notes that figure exceeded Japanese deaths from the atomic bombings, which I think adds neglected perspective and context to both tragic events. The book devotes the first five chapters to the Sino-Japanese war before venturing into the realm of international diplomacy and war planning in Chapters 6 - 10. Japan launches the initial attacks against the British and Americans in Chapter 11. Frank devotes one hefty chapter apiece to the campaigns in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and the Philippines (in that order). The book ends with the US carrier strikes on the Marshall Islands (and Rabaul) and the Doolittle Raid. Don't be put off by the apparent lack of footnotes in the text. There are a few of the explanatory variety sprinkled throughout the narrative, but the author has opted for endnotes - several hundred pages of them in fact. Although on the surface that might seem overwhelming to some, I found many of the discursive endnotes as interesting as the core narrative. The author included - in my estimation - adequate maps and some excellent photographs. Editing was also above average so there were very few, if any, disconcerting typos. The production values for the book itself were impressive also, the binding seems sturdy and the pages appeared durable. My only quibble is that I found the author's writing style a trifle ponderous at times. I highly recommend this book. Even if you have read a number of earlier works on the topic - this book is still worth adding to your library shelves.

Very interesting book. I thought it gave a GREAT overview of the Japanese invasion of China and how the Chinese Army, despite many shortcomings, essentially fought the Japanese to a standstill. I gained more respect for parts of the Chinese Army. Also understand much better Chiang Kai-shek's understandable mistrust of the British. I also thought Frank's evaluation of General Stillwell was honestly refreshing. The rest of the book was similar to Ian Toll's trilogy on the war in the Pacific. Looking forward to the remaining two volumes.

Avevo letto lo splendido libro "Guadalcanal" di R.Frank e mi sono quindi affrettato ad acquistare "Tower of skulls" nella speranza di ritrovare le ottime descrizioni delle battaglie, ma ripartendo da Pearl Harbor. In realtà sono rimasto deluso, in quanto questi libri sono completamente diversi l'uno dall'altro. L'opera prevede una approfondita narrazione iniziale della guerra tra Cina e Giappone, con ottime descrizioni delle battaglie ed approfondite analisi politiche degli eventi accaduti, oltre che dei protagonisti di quell'immane tragedia. Si arriva finalmente al 7 Dicembre 41 solamente a pagina 266, dopo una profonda analisi delle fonti di intelligence e delle complesse implicazioni diplomatiche. Le operazioni militari da Pearl Harbor in poi fino all'Aprile 42 vengono descritte su 254 pagine, in modo completo ma troppo sintetico, riservando peraltro le descrizioni più approfondite alle battaglie terrestri, descrivendo purtroppo in modo sommario gli scontri navali, con sole 6 pagine dedicate alla battaglia navale del mare di Giava mentre altre 6 sono dedicate alle operazioni terrestri sulla stessa isola. Si arriva al termine delle operazioni militari a pagina 522, dopo una brevissima descrizione di 3 pagine delle operazioni giapponesi nell'oceano Indiano accadute tra il 4 ed il 9 Aprile, davvero troppo poche per descrivere gli attacchi su Colombo e Trincomalee e gli attacchi alle navi britanniche, oltre alle operazioni del vice ammiraglio Ozawa nel golfo del Bengala e degli I-BOOT sulla costa occidentale Indiana. Lo spazio non mancava di certo, anche perchè a seguire vengono proposte ben 228 pagine di note, indici e riconoscimenti vari, davvero troppe.

Die Werbung spricht von "definite History of the Pacific War", Magisteral Triology. Ja, das mag sein. Als interessierter Laie lese ich auch gerne das dritte oder vierte Buch zum gleichen Thema - man lernt immer etwas Neues. Das Buch ist mit 757 Seiten hier auf Amazon angegeben. Davon sind rund 250 Seiten Notizen und Bibliografien. Das mag für eine Magisterarbeit unbedingt nötig sein, täuscht aber um über den tatsächlichen Umfang des Buches . Und das fand ich dann doch "etwas dünn". Werde mir mit Sicherheit die Folgebände nicht mehr kaufen. Zu wenig Stoff auf zu wenig Seiten. Dann doch lieber die Trilogie von Ian W. Toll (Pacific War Trilogy).

I would have to say that not only was the book well-written, I would consider it one of the best considered of the many books written about the period. I would consider that this will be considered a classic account of this period of the conflict.

Good read about the politics and goals of Japan. How they ended up in a mess of their own creation. Looking forward to the next volume

Excellent. I found it to be a very well-researched, very interesting, and very readable history of World War II in the Pacific covering the years 1937 - 1942. What distinguishes Richard Frank's work from other truly excellent works like John Toland's But not in Shame - Rising Sun, and Ian Toll's Pacific War trilogy are basically two things: (i) a better, fuller, exposition and maybe understanding, of the Sino-Japanese conflict, and (ii) access to new material, including Willem Remmelink's edited translation of the Japanese official history of The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies and The Operations of the [Imperial Japanese] Navy in the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal, and Andrew Boyd's The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942. Richard Frank makes a good stab at covering the war in the Dutch East Indies generally, including, the land fighting on the island of Java, (probably because he had access to the modern translation into English of the Japanese official history of the land campaign), although from a purely naval aspect I prefer Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II by Jeffrey Cox and Battle of the Java Sea by David Thomas. Nit-picking aside, I have one important disagreement with Richard Frank, (and some minor disagreements). He says that the native population of the Dutch East Indies were desperate to see the end of Dutch Rule and joyously welcomed the Japanese. My father is Dutch-white, and was born and raised on the island of Java just before the Japanese invaded. As someone who was there at the time, he said to me that the native population was curious and awaited events. This is confirmed in the war memoir Vier Maanden onder de Jappen op Java en mijn Ontsnapping by Cornelius Van Der Grift, and also in Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia edited by Remco Raben. On the other side of the equation there is the war memoir / history book entitled Bersiap!: opstand in het paradijs : de Bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945-1946 by Herman Bussemaker who says that the native population did welcome the arrival of the Japanese troops. My own more nuanced interpretation is that the general population were curious and awaited events, but that young men and boys, particularly from Java and Sumatra, often did walk along and welcome the Japanese troops, (and many would later go on to join the Japanese Hitler Youth equivalent called Permuda and the Japanese Waffen SS type army called Peta that would go on to rape, kidnap and murder through the days of Sukarno, Suharto, and even recently in East Timor). The movie images of locals waving Japanese flags seem "false" to me. In Genesis of Power by Salim Said the author speaks of the older population being contaminated by Dutch Rule, and on what I have read and heard it seems that plenty of the local population preferred Dutch rule to Republican rule after the Japanese surrender in 1945. This is all what you would expect. Holland / The Netherlands is not some evil Nazi Germany / Imperial Japanese type country. Dutch rule was largely consensual. In the run up to the Japanese invasion the East Indies were a well-run, prosperous, peaceful, colony, with only a handful of whites / europeans, (far less than the 250,000 mentioned by Richard Frank, a figure that includes the mixed race Dutch). I also think that much more opinion / commentary could have been made by Richard Frank about the Dutch High Command and the decisions that they took. Richard Frank has got plenty to say about the British High Command in Malaya - Singapore, but he largely limits himself to recounting what happened on the island of Java, and says very little about whether he thinks the decisions taken were right and whether the protagonists, Helfrich, Ter Poorten, van Oyen, Alidius Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the Dutch government in exile, (and earlier in the run up to war), were any good / whether they got it right. Richard Frank is condemnatory about the internment of Japanese Americans living in the western mainland United States. It is worth mentioning that the Dutch also interned the Japanese living in the Dutch East Indies. The Governor-General, Alidius Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, did intervene to make sure that the Japanese were humanely treated in the camps, and it is worth comparing it all with how the Japanese treated Dutch, British, and American civilian internees during the war. Yes, the Japanese living on mainland United States almost certainly did not need to be interned from an internal security perspective, (although query whether that was only because the overwhelming balance of power in favour of the United States made disloyalty not pay ... there is an incident given by Richard Frank that hints that had Imperial Japan come close to occupying the United States then Japanese Americans might have thrown in their lot with Japan, as they did in Malaya, Singapore, and the East Indies), but a sense of proportion is needed. I am not aware that the Japanese who were interned were beaten, starved, raped, and sometimes simply outright murdered by United States personnel guarding them. All caveats aside, this work by Richard Frank is superb. It is complementary to the other excellent works that there are on the Pacific War, and is very definitely worth buying and reading in its own right.